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Abstract
This working paper briefly examines how literature and policy-oriented approaches 
address EU-NATO cooperative relations and how they inform perceptions about the 
two organizations. It debates how internal and external challenges affect the euro-Atlantic 
region and create opportunities for better euro-atlantic cooperation, whether in the 
context of  diverse security and defence configurations or within the formal settings of  
the two organizations. It argues that a saturation of  the security and defence environment, 
through the proliferation of  multilateral, minilateral and through strategic approaches 
does not hinder euro-atlantic cooperation. It highlights contexts of  opportunity and 
advantages of  enhanced cooperation between EU/CSDP and NATO. Finally, it envisages 
the development of  current and expected venues for euro-atlantic cooperation. 
Keywords
Multilateralism; security and defence cooperation; CSDP and NATO.
Resumo
O presente working paper examina concisamente os contributos teóricos e aplicados 
sobre as relações de cooperação entre a União Europeia e a NATO e como é que ambas 
as dimensões informam perceções sobre as duas organizações. Debate como é que 
os desafios internos e externos afetam a região euro-atlântica, criando oportunidades 
estratégicas para uma melhor cooperação, no quadro de configurações de segurança no 
plano multilateral, minilateral e das parcerias estratégicas e como é que estas beneficiam 
o domínio da segurança cooperativa. Por último evidencia contextos de oportunidade no 
desenvolvimento da cooperação entre a EU/CSDP e a NATO e antecipa quadros de 
evolução da cooperação entre as duas organizações. 
Palavras-chave
Multilateralismo; cooperação no domínio da segurança e defesa; PCSD e NATO.
8 ProsPects for euro-AtlAntic cooPerAtion
 idn cAdernos 9
1. Security Contexts of  Cooperation in Literature 
This working paper looks at the contemporary security challenges at the European 
and transatlantic level from the perspective of  opportunities to improve EU-NATO 
cooperation. The study with a more policy oriented than theoretical focus, does not offer 
an exhaustive literature review, but rather introduces an explanation on how contexts of  
political and strategic opportunity translate into the EU and NATO security discourse 
and practice at the multilateral, minilateral and “strategic bilateral” level from a security 
and defence policy perspective. It examines the advantages of  euro-atlantic cooperation 
with respect to the political and strategic relations between the two organizations, in 
terms of  collaborative practice and in the context of  adaptation of  the two organiza-
tions. Despite the presence of  challenges, the adaptive cooperative behaviour of  both 
organizations proves their persistence and resilience to the evolving changes in the inter-
national environment. The study identifies modalities that may lead to better cooperation 
between the EU and NATO, considering the distinct nature of  both organizations.
Strains regarding cooperation between European and transatlantic allies date back to 
the Cold War period at a time when, growing tensions led President Charles de Gaulle, in 
a letter sent to President Lyndon Johnson,1 to announce the withdrawal of  France from 
NATO’s integrated command structure. Since then, numerous academics and policy 
makers, whenever assessing euro-atlantic relations tend to stress more the divisive, then 
the binding aspects of  security cooperation between the European Union and NATO. 
Across time, academic research on the EU and NATO relations, whether one refers to 
more theoretical approaches or to research with a policy oriented focus, evolved from an 
interest in the more contending aspects of  cooperative relations (Ojannen 2006; Everts 
2003; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Hyde-Price 2004 and 2006; Hunter 2002; Duke 2008; 
Lodgaard 1992), to a focus concerned with what may bring them together in terms of  
security and defence cooperation (Koops 2010 and 2017; Duke 2019). After early 2000, 
research started to express an interest in aspects related to the euro-atlantic organizations 
institutional design and their role in international security, leading to studies on institu-
tional isomorphism (Nunes 2006; Hoffman 2009) at a time when, NATO seemed to 
absorb some civilian tasks2 and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) sought 
to develop a more strategic and military based approach to its international and regional 
relations.3 Throughout the decade, the adaptation process of  NATO and the EU (Walt 
2008; Wallender 2000), deserved different levels of  attention, largely focusing on the 
1 Letter from President Charles de Gaulle to President Lyndon Johnson on France’s withdrawal from the 
NATO command structure (March 7, 1966).
2 The concept of  Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) was first tested in Afghanistan, in the provinces 
where the coalition forces were operating. The PRT were created to promote reconstruction projects in the 
region and provide support to development initiatives, leading to better stability in the country. After 2003, 
these teams were led by countries, other than the U.S., in a total of  16 countries. Also, in Afghanistan, 
NATO sought for the first time to invest on Security Sector Reform in order to improve coordination 
between Afghan security forces and NATO contingents in the country. For further reading see Karp and 
Ponzio (2007, pp. 219-238).
3 See Nunes (2006). 
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impact of  the enlargement process, the role of  bureaucracies and international socializa-
tion in the construction of  communities of  practice, bound by common practices 
(Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Græger 2017), having NATO gained more interest, 
as compared to that of  EU/CSDP. 
The changes that occurred at the international level, following the interventions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria with the global fight on terrorism, increased domestic and 
international competition among security actors. It pressed organizations for alternative 
forms of  international and regional cooperation in order to meet an evolving strategic 
environment, characterized by the so called “new threats” of  maritime piracy, hybrid and 
cyber threats.4 In the face of  new security contexts, organizations such as NATO and the 
EU, were not strange to the necessity to develop strategic partnerships, as a process to 
enhance cooperation (Schori 2005; Smith and Gebhard 2017; Drent et al. 2015). In the 
case of  Europe, that was strengthened in 2003 by a recently acquired strategic focus, with 
the endorsement of  the European Security Strategy. Additionally, other contributions 
focused on how strategic partnerships worked in the context of  integrated systems 
(Grevy 2012; Renard 2016). The period that followed the presentation of  the EU Global 
Strategy, in 2016 and its claim of  greater strategic autonomy informed much of  the 
research contributions on whether this aim would further European political integration 
(Barbé and Morillas 2019; Hooghe and Marks 2019; Tardy 2018; Schimmelfennig 2019) 
or it would strengthened or weakened EU-NATO cooperation (Heisbourg et al. 2000; 
Howorth 2018 and 2019; Græger 2017; Smith and Gebhard 2017; Binnendijk 2018). This 
would renew the research focus on inter-organizational competition between the two 
organizations, sourced in the EU ambition towards strategic autonomy (Leonard and 
Shapiro 2019a; Howorth 2019 and 2019a; Biscop 2019).
This particular emphasis on inter-organizational competition (Howorth 2014; Simón 
2019) happens as NATO strategically returned to the foundational area of  application of  
the Washington Treaty. This was the case with a gradual withdrawal of  the US and NATO 
from Afghanistan an Iraq, following the out of  area era period, amid the intensification 
of  war in Syria and Libya and Russia’s revisionist foreign policy in Ukraine. While in the 
EU case, the EU/CSDP post 2016 institutional developments signalled not only the will 
to strengthen its strategic autonomy and reinforce its security-defence nexus, but also to 
welcome the role of  new defence actors in the CSDP structure, such as the European 
Commission, as studied by Haroche (2018 and 2019), Besch (2018; 2019; 2019a), 
Marrone and Ungaro (n.d.), and Chappell et al. (2019). The participation of  actors 
other than the Member States, the European Council and the European Defence 
Agency (EDA), such as the European Commission, also added to research on European 
defence, perspectives concerned with organizational change and adaption, driven for 
reasons of  public management and “business cultures” (Norheim-Martisen 2016). Oth-
ers departed from the institutionalization of  new security and defence roles for new 
actors, to highlight the conditions under which defence institutions evolve in response 
4 For further reading see Lindstrom and Tardy (2019).
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to operational demands and to the interdependence of  defence markets (Fiott 2017 
and 2019).
2. Strategic Strains as Opportunities
The emphasis on inter-organizational competition, on duplication and burden 
sharing of  risks and costs, it is far from being a new theme among euro-Atlantic relations. 
Four reasons may explain the recurrence of  competing visions on security and defence. 
First, it may occur more often whenever organizations’ strategic ambitions, mandates 
and capabilities become similar or when one of  them seeks to acquire greater strategic 
autonomy, beyond traditional political and “functional leadership” (Swielende 2019, p. 4). 
Second, it may result from the tensions derived from the obligations that result from 
membership overlap and states preferences, for one or several particular strategic 
partners. In the EU-NATO case, twenty-two countries are full members of  both organi-
zations. Third, it may be exacerbated by functional dependency of  the major power(s), 
which alone cannot undertake the full spectrum of  security and defence tasks, reason for 
which it relies on “middle powers” (Chase 1996) to fulfil power goals regionally and 
internationally. Fourth, discussions on inter-organizational competition may be guided by 
business/industry related interests, retained by those states which are more robust in 
strategic, technological, research and industrial terms.
All these reasons have been conditioning security and defence relations between the 
two sides of  the Atlantic. During President Bill Clinton second mandate (1997-2001), 
Secretary of  State Madeleine Albright in a firm reaction (Rutten 2001; Albright 1998) to 
the Joint Declaration, signed between the France and the United Kingdom on defence 
cooperation, on the 4 December 1998, known as the Saint Malo Declaration (Franco-
British St. Malo Declaration 1998), voiced against any division of  the decision making 
process in transatlantic security and defence; any discrimination of  non-EU allies and any 
duplication of  means between the two organizations. This reserve appeared to have 
ignored the fact the agreement, despite celebrated between two major European security 
and defence players, was in fact a bilateral agreement, signed outside the EU structure, 
signalling a formal ‘rapprochement’ between two allies, in the aftermath of  Balkan crisis 
and of  the intervention in Kosovo, in 1999. 
Public and political declaratory expressions of  inter-organizational and functional 
competition between the United States, the EU and NATO have been continuously 
tested by the ambivalences sourced in the political narrative and even in the strategic 
guidelines of  American administrations, whenever referring to European allies or the 
EU. The notion of  a European Security and Defence Identity or that of  a NATO’s 
European pillar5, is often at odds with the American pressure for an increase in budgetary 
contributions of  European allies, materialized in the 2% of  defence spending and 
demand for stronger commitment to NATO’s military operations, versus the revindica-
5 A designation that dates back to early 90s which persistently lasted in policy documents almost until 2003. 
See also North Atlantic Council (1990).
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tion of  a more independent operational output by the EU. These incongruities on 
political, financial and operational transatlantic collective commitment versus strategic 
independence of  EU/CSDP, sometimes demanded and others refuted by the U.S., 
hindered cooperation in the euro-atlantic context. 
In the end of  1990s, following the adoption of  NATO’s Defence Capabilities 
Initiative (North Atlantic Council 1999) and in accordance with NATO 1999 Strategic 
Concept, the Alliance non-Article 5 crisis response tasks gained a new focus calling for 
smaller scale and better multilateral cooperation with partners, even with a “limited 
access to existing NATO infrastructure” (North Atlantic Council 1999, § 3), for 
operations outside the Alliance territory. The capability gap between American and 
European allies was evident with respect to the capacity of  their armed forces to adapt 
to the demands of  the post-Cold War international security environment in the sense 
of  creating smaller, more deployable and sustainable forces for out-of-area operations, 
combined with effective airlift capabilities and better strategic intelligence.
The diplomatic position of  Secretary of  State Madeleine Albright was soon balanced 
by the public statements reiterated by NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson and 
the United States Secretary of  Defence William Cohen, with the support of  the High 
Representative Xavier Solana6 underlining the need for better cooperation on the base of  
“indivisibility” of  the transatlantic relations, on the “incremental” nature of  capabilities 
development and on the “inclusiveness” of  all allies in the euro-Atlantic transformational 
process of  security cooperation. 
This more inclusive approach was crucial at a time when allies were divided follow-
ing NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, without a UN Security Council mandate. In 2001 
this situation was aggravated by the American intervention in Afghanistan, despite the 
fact Canada and European allies offered to invoke Article 5 of  the North Atlantic Treaty, 
in support of  the United States, following the attack to its territorial integrity on the 9 
of  September.
During President George Bush term, the administration adopted a harsher tone on 
what concerned relations between NATO and Europe, triggered by the Secretary of  
Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s views about long standing allies, such as Germany and 
France, by defining them as “the old Europe”, due to the reserves invoked by both to the 
interventions in Iraq. The cooperative relation between the two organizations was to wit-
ness another setback with Rumsfeld public suggestion that, those operations at the high-
end of  the defence spectrum were to be undertaken by the United States and the low 
intensity ones were to be assumed by European allies, setting aside the notion inclusive 
cooperation. These political, diplomatic and strategic tensions led, during the Tervuren 
Summit7 in 2003, to the proposal on the constitution of  a European headquarters with 
6 Lord George Robertson was NATO’s Secretary General between 1999 and 2003, William Cohen was 
appointed United States Secretary of  Defence from 1997 till 2001 and Xavier Solana High held the 
position of  High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy between 1999 and 2009.
7 Meeting of  the Heads of  State and Government of  Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium on 
European Defence (2003).
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the support of  France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands against the position of  
the United Kingdom, which would end up by obstructing the institutionalization of  an 
EU headquarters for European-led missions and operations.
It was in this unlikely atmosphere that the Berlin Plus Agreement was signed on 
the 17 march 2003, through a formal exchange of  Letters between the EU High Repre-
sentative and NATO’s Secretary General. The first materialization of  the agreement 
was implemented in 2004 during Operation Althea, a EU-led operation in Bosnia Herze-
govina which succeeded NATO’s SFOR Operation, meant to further cooperation with 
Bosnian authorities in securing the region. This agreement led to an appeasement 
between European and transatlantic allies. This rapprochement was already noticeable in 
previous years, with respect to Germany, related with NATO’s process of  ratification 
on changes to the Washington Treaty, completed in 1999, which enabled the beginning 
of  the enlargement process to Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, a certain 
disinvestment of  the United Sates in southwestern allies was preceded by a new strategic 
valorisation of  relations with Germany and with Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, for reasons of  military mobility and force projection, following the US led interven-
tion in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
With President Barack Obama Administration, the call for a stronger European 
engagement in NATO8 did not ease. The White House, through Defence Secretary 
Robert Gates (2011), expressed concerns that European allies would not be able to meet 
the then current threats without “structural institutional reforms” and “actual share” of  
risks and responsibilities. In 2011, during his farewell speech in Brussels, Gates in a 
strong tone, underlined that although “NATO Libya mission did meet its initial military 
objectives”, it was affected by scarce funding and limited military participation by Euro-
pean allies. The statement, regardless European allies collective support to the mission, 
voiced concerns that NATO would turn into a divided alliance between those specialized 
in “soft humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those con- 
ducting the hard combat missions” (Idem, ibidem)9, echoing Donald Rumsfeld tacit 
suggested division of  strategic work, between north Americans and Europeans. 
In 2014, the several revisionist attempts of  Russia’s foreign policy towards Eastern 
European countries, which culminated with the intervention and occupation of  Crimea, 
not only strengthen the role of  EU-NATO cooperation, but also that of  the EU and 
Germany.10 In March, on the first meeting of  the European Council after the annexation 
of  Crimea, the EU and Member states endorsed the anticipation of  the signature of  
8 See Quadrennial Defence Review (2014).
9 In Libya, Operation Unified Protector started on the 22 March 2011 through a NATO-led coalition of  the 
willing, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 with the aim to protect Libyan civilians, 
enforce the arms embargo and create a no-fly zone. All Allies participated in the mission, either directly or 
indirectly, made use of  NATO’s command structures and common funding in support the operation. 
Partner countries such as Sweden, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates also provided 
support to the operation, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm.
10 European Council (2014/EUCO7/1/14).
14 ProsPects for euro-AtlAntic cooPerAtion
political provisions, regarding the Association Agreement with Ukraine and accelerated 
the process related to similar agreements with Georgia and Moldova, in an attempt to 
provide political guarantees to Ukraine and neighbouring countries, in case further 
attempts against sovereign rights where made by Moscow. This political and diplomatic 
initiatives were followed by measures leading to financial assistance and to political and 
economic reforms in Ukraine.11 Humanitarian aid to the country was made available by 
the European Commission. Germany took the lead in the imposition of  sanctions 
towards Russia and conducted the majority of  high-level diplomatic meetings with Pres-
ident Putin. 
NATO on its hand would strengthen measures to protect the Baltic States airspace, it 
carried out exercises in Central and Eastern European countries and it reinforced opera-
tional readiness by committing Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces in the territorial 
periphery of  the Alliance. In the defence domain, NATO and the EU agreed, through 
NATO’s Secretary General Stoltenberg and the EU High Representative Mogherini on 
tightening political contacts and coordinating exercises, paving the way to what would be 
the EU-NATO joint declaration that would follow. The exogenous pressures related with 
Russian foreign policy and the consequences of  the 2015 refugee crisis, led NATO and the 
EU to identify common ground to cooperate in a more strategic manner. As observed by 
Dempsey, this new opportunity for cooperation allowed both NATO and the EU/CSDP 
to “transcend traditional responses in which NATO performs hard-power tasks and the 
EU takes on soft-power tasks” (2016, p. 14). These external challenges opened up new 
collaborative opportunities from crisis management in response to terrorism, hybrid and 
cyber threats, to cooperation on strengthening resilience and improve local ownership.
The situation in Ukraine was to a certain extent decisive in the way the EU and 
NATO forged what would be the EU-NATO Joint Declarations of  2016 and 2018 and 
perhaps determinant in the choice of  the security and defence platforms from which to 
draw cooperation, notably on how to handle state led disinformation, cyber defence and 
hybrid warfare.
In 2016, following the election of  Donald Trump, the contending arguments that 
often hampered euro-atlantic security and defence cooperation would persist, with the 
White House constructing a(n) (in)security narrative that valued the isolationism of  
American foreign policy and the deepening of  traditional bilateral relations with the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Israel.12 In 2018, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, the most public and authoritative document that encompasses central 
strategic guidelines to American defence policy, was replaced by the National Defense 
Review. The document reiterated that the American executive “expects European allies 
to fulfil their commitments to increase defense and modernization spending to bolster 
the alliance in the face of  our shared security concerns” (2018, p. 9), in a recap of  what 
is a constant feature of  American foreign and defence policy.
11 European Council (2014/EUCO 237/14).
12 For further reading see National Defense Strategy (2018).
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It was in this context characterized by American unilateralism and isolationist turn, 
Russian revisionism and attempts to further develop European defence, that a second 
and third EU-NATO joint declarations were forged.
The military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, and NATO’s participation on the 
International Security Assistance Force epitomised, in operational terms, the concept of  
out-of-area giving it a new purpose.13 But it was the failure of  this fourteen years long 
endeavour in creating the desired stability, in achieving internal political reconciliation, 
in contributing to prevent the establishment of  a Taliban safe haven and Al Qaeda’s 
consolidation of  a stronghold, as well as its helplessness in containing the birth of  the 
designated Islamic State in 2014, that sent NATO back to its original area of  strategic 
responsibility, 14 for reasons of  collective fatigue and common interest. This despite 
NATO’s significant and successful military presence in the coast of  Somalia, through 
Operation Allied Provider, in conjunction with the EU NAVFOR Atalanta on anti-piracy 
and anti-armed robbery at sea. Both helped keeping sea lanes safe and ensure the protec-
tion and support to the UN World Food Programme.15 However, these missions were 
kept separated, only with occasional “ad hoc interaction” (Koops 2010, p. 55).16
To Europe, NATO’s necessity to remain in out-of-area, further intra-Alliance 
tensions, while the EU consolidated its ambition for a more strategic approach to inter-
national affairs, guided by the principles of  respect for international multilateral order. 
With it, the EU sought to acquire a renewed legitimacy, reiterating its value-based 
approach to international security by increasing its cooperation with the United Nations 
and by attaining a new strategic stand in crisis response, with successive institutional 
improvements of  its crisis response system, within European External Action Service.
In Europe and in the neighbourhood, Russia’s foreign policy in the East and its 
presence in the Levant region, simplified the return of  NATO to the North Atlantic 
Treaty founding geography and to its original “motivation for partnership” (Walt 1997, 
pp. 159 and 161). Three years later, during his first visit to NATO Headquarters, for 
the occasion of  the meeting of  Heads of  State and Government, President Donald 
Trump would question NATO’s strategic utility, affirming the obsolescence of  NATO 
and questioning the loyalty and strategic reliance of  European allies.17 Additionally, by 
13 This new purpose would translate into a new strategic outreach for NATO and its allies, better operational 
output and substantial technological developments in the ways of  conducting warfare.
14 That is, with a special focus on the security of  its eastern border following Russia’s intervention in Crimea. 
15 See Operation Allied Provider available at https://shape.nato.int/page13984631.aspx EU NAVFOR 
Atalanta and available at https://eunavfor.eu/mission/. 
16 Joachim Koops offers one of  the most complete research accounts of  EU-NATO relations for the period 
comprehended between 1949 and 2010 offering a rich literature embedded and empirically driven 
explanation. See Koops (2011 and 2017).
17 This was not President Donald Trump only diplomatic legacy to the world, it would be followed by the 
withdrawal from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships Talks, from the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, the questioning of  the utility of  the nuclear agreement with Iran, the moving the US 
embassy to Jerusalem and more recently by cancelling the restrictions imposed by the former Obama 
Administration prohibiting American military forces from employing anti-personnel landmines outside of  
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not endorsing NATO’s commitment to collective defence, the American President put 
into question the support to mutual assurances drawn from Article 5, in case a military 
aggression to allied countries occurs. This raised apprehensions over the collective defen-
sive nature of  the Alliance and its guarantee 18 of  mutualisation of  security and defence 
risks. Both collective defence and the integrity of  the European project could have been 
at stake, in a particularly sensitive time for European cohesion due to the pressures of  
nationalism, populism and the exacerbated manifestations of  national interests that led 
to the British referendum.
3.  Cooperation in Times of  Diverse Security and Defence Confi- 
gurations
Since 2002, initiatives in the direction of  closer security and defence cooperation, 
happen as a different European security governance system started to take shape around 
the idea of  a European interests-based approach to international affairs, first with the 
2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and in 2016 with the EU Global Strategy 
(EUGS). The fact the EUGS was not endorsed by the Council, did not prevented it 
from paving the way to a variety of  new security and defence initiatives of  voluntary and 
also contractual nature (Nunes 2017). This shows that the EUGS offered opportunities 
for Member States to agree, even in a juridically binding manner19, outside the formality 
of  the endorsement of  the document that was to replace the ESS. Similarly, the EES 
although often criticized for not having the characteristics of  a “strategy”, did not pre-
vent the EU from an instrumental approach to NATO leading to the 2003 EU-NATO 
Joint Declaration. 
The development of  this new European strategic approach reveals a constant 
tension between two political centres, within which engagement in collaborative crisis 
management can happen. That of  Brussels, calling for further security and defence 
integration, while cooperating with NATO and that of  capable and willing European 
member states interested in preserving their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. These 
developments towards what sometimes appears to generate conflicting courses of  action, 
has produced a layered system where cooperation occurs in different configurations. 
These configurations coexist and sometimes compete with formal organizations such as 
the EU/CSDP and NATO and the cooperative framework that result from EU-NATO 
Joint Declarations of  2016 and 2018. This system of  security governance is a three- 
layered system where multilateralism, minilateralism and strategic bilateralism coexist, 
allowing participants to accommodate goals, benefits and security practices that emanate 
at the EU and NATO level, with those driven by particular national interests. 
the Korean Peninsula, by suspending financial support to the World Health Organizations and withdrawing 
the United States from the Open Skies Treaty
18 On this particular condition of  persistence of  an alliance, see Walt (1997, p. 157).
19 It was the case with the approval in 2017 of  a Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured 
Cooperation. 
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Each serves a different collaborative purpose. Multilateralism20 in the framework of  
cooperative security arrangements comprehends a majority of  participants in a given 
security regime21 for instance that of  the UN, NATO or EU, leading to the development 
of  formal and long-lasting cooperation and coordination among states and organiza-
tions. Conversely, minilateralism comprises a few like-minded and willing participants, 
with similar national interests and approaches to foreign and security policy, as well as 
identical operational output. Distinctive from multilateralism and minilateralism, “strate-
gic bilateralism” (Renard 2016, p. 14) involves particular forms of  selective engagement 
of  strategically able and willing participants with self-interested motives in converging 
security views and policies, whether those are defence and security policies or security 
issue-based concerns such as terrorism, cyber or hybrid threats. 
Being beyond the scope of  this paper, these security configurations offers analytical 
space to empirical research allowing to test in which conditions, how this coexistence 
strengthens or conversely weakens cooperative security and how it impacts on Euro-
Atlantic security. The inclusion of  a multilateralist focus in major political and strategic 
documents, such as the Treaty of  Lisbon, the European Security Strategy (Council of  the 
European Union 2003), the EU Global Strategy (High Representative 2016) and NATO 
Strategic Concept (North Atlantic Council 2010) is accompanied by references to a 
normative and ruled based multilateral stand, on which both the EU and NATO are 
founded and from which they draw legitimacy for their external action in crisis mana- 
gement and conflict resolution.
This constitutive base for common security and collective action has also been 
shaping the base for cooperative output between the two organizations, having the EU’s 
interpretation of  multilateralism, a normative and regulative emphasis that binds indi-
vidual to common interests and obligations, while promoting “issue-based engagements” 
(Council of  the European Union 2019, § 8 and 9) preferred by Member States and 
partners. Since 2016, an officially assumed interest-based approach to security and 
defence can be identified in several EU documents, such as the EU Global Strategy, the 
European Commission statements on the launch of  the European Defence Fund or in 
the process leading to the institutionalisation of  a Directorate General for Defence. Such 
initiatives may also translate what seems to be a more strategic European approach to 
new concepts, such as resilience or ownership22, while “principled pragmatism” appears 
as the new guiding principle for common foreign, security and defence policy, to use the 
expression adopted by the EU Global Strategy itself.
20 Multilateralism is considered as a set of  constitutive collective rules based on reciprocity of  rights and 
duties, regarding the security dilemmas of  participants, the containment of  potential deviant policy 
behaviour and the guarantee of  transparency concerning anticipatory behaviour. This enables a threefold 
base for international cooperation to happen under the form of  “international order, international regimes, 
and international organizations” (Ruggie 2011, p. 332). 
21 International regimes are narrower in competences, being issue specific regarding which consensus on 
policies and procedures may lead to broader coordination and cooperation and even to de-securitization 
of  security themes within and outside international and regional organizations.
22 European Commission and High Representative (2017/21 final). See also Romanova (2019).
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In the EU context, this emerging security governance discourse and practice based 
on effective multilateralism seeks to help confirming the Union as a security provider. 
First, it legitimises and reiterates the international stand of  the European Union through 
international law, on the base of  values, but also of  interests that constitute a given 
multilateral structure. Second, it informs a normative and regulative basis for internal 
and external relations of  Member States by reducing the space between these two levels 
of  security. Third, it sets a comprehensive platform of  cooperative engagement to 
harmonize implementation of  guidelines, to improve coordination and to enhance 
cooperation at different levels: the international, the regional and the local. Fourth, in 
those non-juridically binding policy domains or on those areas which fall outside the 
aquis communautaire, it offers the opportunity for willing compliance among Member 
States (Nunes 2018). Due to the EU institutional design, with multi-level decision making 
levels, complex formal decision-making structure and wide-ranging external relations, 
multilateralism offers a broader multi-layered and trans-sectoral scope for policy action. 
It comprehends diverse policy domains with security implications from crisis manage-
ment to humanitarian and development aid, adding to security new themes such as 
cyberspace or climate change and making available different policy instruments, whether 
one refers to those of  trade, foreign policy, security and more recently defence.
The EU forms a regional order, within which the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and CSDP constitute a security regime shared by Member States, where 
the EU leads various multilateral processes (Ujvari 2016, p. 2) from trade to development. 
In a European context, multilateralism also means a system of  governance within which 
traditional actors such as the UN, NATO and African Union coexist with emergent 
actors like China or India or with decision-making frameworks23 such as the North Atlan-
tic Council. 
Multilateralism has been a cross cutting theme in the EU and NATO policy docu-
ments.24 Being suggested by some as hindering national interest, it is acknowledged by 
others as a prevailing governance system. This despite a tendency for bilateralization of  
policies, manifestation of  preference for intergovernmental decision-making methods or 
regionalization of  security and defence through minilateralism of  security and defence 
initiatives, as explained further ahead. Multilateral platforms, such as NATO and the 
EU, favour jointness of  action and harmonization of  understandings on security. Despite 
the presence of  other cooperative configurations, it is still a lasting method of  coopera-
tion in the euro-atlantic context for several reasons. First, it is likely to gain support 
for legitimacy reasons adding normative guidance and representativeness to security 
practice, due to the number of  participants involved, serving both common and particu-
lar interests. In June 2019, the European Council Conclusions describes it as “the best 
way to advance national, as well as collective interests” (Council of  the European Union 
2019, § 2). Second, for reasons of  self-regulation of  security and defence relations among 
23 Cf. Ujvari and Balazs (2016, p. 3).
24 Council of  the European Union (2019). See also Parajon et al. (2019).
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participants, predisposing them to self-restrain, as opposed to “more common unilateral 
and less restrained methods” (Jervis 1985, p. 59). Third, for facilitating ad hoc access to 
resources and security and defence goods, such as common or collective knowledge, 
expertise and capabilities. 
The minilateralist configuration of  security and defence cooperation is characterised 
by cooperative arrangements among like-minded countries, for instance in the EU case 
under the form of  “Pooling & Sharing” initiatives or “Smart Defence” in the case of  
NATO, gathering strategically able countries. It may occur within the EU and NATO or 
outside them. Minilateralism means a “diplomatic process of  a small group of  interested 
parties working together to supplement or complement the activities of  international 
organizations in tackling subjects deemed too complicated to be addressed appropriately 
at the multilateral level” (Moret 2016, p. 2). This means that being a more flexible 
configuration, than formal multilateral agreements, located within security and defence 
organizations, it may generate better adherence and compliance from interested parti- 
cipants. In the security and defence domain, minilateralism gathers politically willing, 
self-interested and militarily able actors in order to advance what Member States perceive 
to be more difficult to achieve within the binding framework of  security and defence 
organizations. In the European context, minilateralist alternatives are not a novelty being 
envisaged (Nunes 2018, pp. 53-55) in the Lisbon Treaty through: the mechanism of  
“Enhanced Cooperation” (TEU Article 327) in the domain of  the Union’s non-exclusive 
competences; through the 2017 Council Decision (Council Decision (CFSP), 2017/ 
2315),which set forward a Permanent Structured Cooperation among willing and able 
Member States and through the provision of  a “Framework Nation” concept, TEU Arti-
cle 43 (1), through which the Union will retain political control and strategic direction, 
while entrusting “specific responsibilities” or tasks to a Member State in the context of  a 
EU-led missions and operations.25 In operational terms, minilateralism translates into 
a process of  aggregated and shared capabilities, as referred earlier in the context of  
“Pooling & Sharing” or NATO’s “Smart Defence”.
In NATO’s case, due to its issue specific nature, minilateralism is invoked in a 
different manner. It describes a configuration meant to address transnational military 
and non-military challenges from stabilisation operations to counter cyber and hybrid 
threats, often positioned at the upper end of  defence tasks due to its operational demands. 
It can also adopt the format of  coalitions of  the willing26 where some, but not all, of  the 
25 The concept of  framework nation is common to NATO and the EU. It was introduced by Germany in 
June 2013, during NATO ministerial meeting, in reaction to a decrease in defence budgets and aimed at 
supplementing the capability gaps identified by NATO’s Defence and Planning Process, Allers (2016, p. 
1168). See also Palmer (2016). In the EU context the concept dates back to 2002, when a conceptual basis 
for the conduct of  EU-led missions and operations was introduced by designating a Member State or a 
group of  Member States for, on a voluntary basis, to act as the Framework Nation, see EEAS (2015). It 
was formally included in the European Union Treaty in 2009. 
26 See Nunes (2017, p. 58). For a study on the impact of  coalitions of  the willing on structures of  international 
law and inclusive multilateralism, see Rodiles (2018) and Weitsman (2013).
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Alliance members engage in the pursuit of  security and defence goals.27 In this case, it 
serves the purpose of  a more rapid response to threats, with less formal legal boundaries 
and complex decision-making procedures derived from international law, as those 
mandatory to the United Nations and EU led-operations or from the constitutive norms 
of  the Washington Treaty, to which the Alliance abides by when acting collectively. 
Changes in the nature of  security, the transnational consequences of  insecurity and 
the growing selective interdependence of  interests among security actors led to a 
renewed interest in minilateralism. Due to the fact it gathers a smaller number of  par-
ticipants, it is better able to promote convergence of  security interests and approaches, 
to accelerate responses to crises and to improve force generation, thus reducing the 
impact of  security dilemmas, as perceived by states and security communities (Nunes 
2017a, p. 18). This is even more relevant in complex security contexts, where different 
interests and preferences prevail in the face of  multiple security challenges and in times 
of  scarce resources. 
The “strategic bilateralism”28 although it may occur within multilateral structures, 
such as international organizations, it also evolves outside the intergovernmental struc-
tures of  the EU crisis management setting and that of  the Alliance’s collective defence. 
In these cases, international and regional institutions may offer what Renard notes (2016, 
p. 31) as the role of  “framing and institutionalizing cooperation (…) and occasionally 
in complementing member States, rather than substituting for them”. More often this 
cooperative configuration denotes a will, as in the case of  the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, France, Canada and the United States to favour agreements at bilateral level 
that safeguard traditional foreign policy interests, outside and without the scrutiny of  
multilateral fora. Mattelaer (2019, p. 13) considers that the “prominence of  bilateral 
diplomacy represents a symptom rather than a cause of  change in the international 
system”. The revival of  bilateral diplomacy can be observed in a wide variety of  formats 
from the formality of  the Lancaster House Treaty between Great Britain and France,29 
following the ratification of  the Lisbon Treaty a year earlier30 to the launch in June 
2018 of  the French led European Intervention Initiative31 or the Franco-Danish 
Defence Cooperation, known as the European Initiative2 (EI2)32 that followed the 
Council Decision of  2017, establishing the first EU Council Decision initiative on Per-
manent Structured Cooperation. The EI2 enabled Denmark to contribute to European 
27 These were the cases of  the operations in the Balkans (1999), first Gulf  War (1990), the intervention 
against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (2001) and Al Qaeda in Iraq (2003) and more recently in 
Libya, following the deposition of  Mohamed Gadafi’s (2011).
28 Giovanni Grevi calls it “Structural partnerships as an “important bilateral means that can be mobilised to 
foster international cooperation” (Grevi 2012, p. 16).
29 Treaty between the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on 
Defence and Security Cooperation (1998).
30 See also Saxi (2017).
31 Letter of  Intent Concerning the Development of  the European Intervention Initiative (2018).
32 Franco-Danish declaration on European security (2018).
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security and defence, outside the PESCO arrangement.33 Lastly, the Achen Treaty on 
Franco-German Cooperation and Integration, signed on the 22 January 201934 through 
which the two countries agreed to “deepen their cooperation in matters of  foreign 
policy, defence, external and internal security and development, while striving to 
strengthen Europe’s ability to act autonomously” (Aachen Treaty, 2019, Article 3). 
Although these initiatives have been agreed outside the European Union and NATO 
they aim at strengthening them, as referred in the preamble or provisions foresee in those 
declarations, while furthering the specific interests and preferences of  contracting parts. 
Being a common practice in international affairs, these three examples: the Lancaster 
House Treaty, the European Intervention Initiative35 and the Aachen Treaty36 occur in 
time, almost simultaneously to other initiatives agreed with the aim to deepen European 
security and defence cooperation, such as PESCO, CARD, the European Defence Fund 
and the setup of  a DG Defence within the European Commission. This does not 
necessarily mean distrust by Member States on the political strength, binding nature or 
operational output of  security and defence initiatives launched within the European 
Union. Strategic bilateralism supplement and is even “conducive to stronger multilateral 
cooperation” (Grevi 2012, p. 16). It may suggest that multilateral initiatives agreed in 
intergovernmental fora, only some of  which legally binding like PESCO and with the 
regulative and financial weigh of  the European Commission, such as the European 
Defence Fund, do not exclude the necessity of  alternative cooperative configurations, 
capacities and operational output that multilateral institutions are unable, or unwilling, to 
deliver as a whole, for reasons of  political interest, contextual opportunity and availability 
of  military and non-military resources.
4. Contexts of  Opportunity for EU-NATO Cooperation
The point of  debate on capability gap still holds true, whether when comparing 
defence expenditures among the EU NATO member states in the Alliance context, 
Europe as a whole or between Europe and the United States.37 
Twenty years later, the American political and very public discourse calling for 
greater strategic responsibility by European allies, coincided with the European Union’s 
33 According to the Protocol agreed with the Lisbon Treaty, Denmark does not take part in CSDP military 
dimension.
34 Aachen Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration (2019).
35 The European Intervention Initiative was agreed in 25 July 2018 through a Letter of  Intent signed by 
defence ministers of  Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. Participants then agreed to join a “flexible, non-binding forum of  European 
participating states which are able and willing to engage their military capabilities and forces when and 
where necessary to protect European security interests, without prejudice to the chosen institutional 
framework (the EU,NATO, the UN or ad hoc coalitions)”, European Intervention Initiative, Letter of  
Intent (2018, § 5).
36 Aachen Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration (2019). 
37 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2020, pp. 28-63). See also Douglas Barrie et al. (2019) and 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2020, pp. 42-43). 
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claim for more strategic autonomy, following the presentation of  the European Global 
Strategy, the launch of  several European cooperative endeavours38 and the development 
of  several bilateral security and defence initiatives, led by strategically strong EU member 
states.39 
In 2016 the lack of  formal endorsement of  NATO’s collective defence by the 
President of  the United States was aggravated by the doubts casted over the ability of  
European allies to allocate resources and commit to defence in the transatlantic context. 
This caused a perception of  political, diplomatic and strategic “devaluation of  the 
alliance”, in the sense attributed by Glen Snyder (1984, p. 467) and posed self-interested 
conditionalities to allies, beyond the 2% of  defence spending target. Although, as 
Snyder (1984, p. 491) years earlier accurately assessed, the European allies should avoid 
the “risk of  entrapment (consisting of) troop withdrawals, American downgrading of  
the priority of  European defence in favour of  other areas such as the Persian Gulf, or a 
further drift to unilateralism”40. These were exactly some of  the decisions adopted and 
initiatives taken by President Trump, as from the earlier years of  his presidency. In 2019, 
during the Munich Security Conference41 former Vice President Joseph Biden, and a 
potential running candidate for the Democratic Party in the 2020 Presidential election, 
did reiterate full support to NATO and to its allies conveying a firm belief  in the 
principle of  collective defence. This position was supported by the majority of  the 
forty-five democratic senators in the United States Senate, by various senior military 
representatives at the Department of  Defense, at the Pentagon and senior diplomats 
and officials in Brussels, proving different perceptions within the American political 
establishment. Despite the rhetoric, the US has been increasing its commitment to 
Europe’s eastern flank, as the account by the Department of  Defense Budget on the 
European Deterrence Initiative demonstrates.42
It was in a political environment of  mutual political distrust, rhetorical and 
diplomatic controversy, of  strained relations between Washington and most European 
capitals, of  fears of  rising nationalism in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, 
38 The Implementation Plan for Security and Defence following the introduction to the European Council 
of  the EU Global Strategy, the agreement on a Council Decision launching a Permanent Structured 
Cooperation initiative in the end of  2017, the agreement on a process of  commitment followed by 
implementation of  targets through a Coordinated Annual Review for Defence and National Implementation 
Plans, the development of  a European Defence Fund and the CSDP Civilian Compact in 2018.
39 Examples of  this can be illustrated by the French-led initiative of  the European Intervention Initiative and 
the Achen Franco-German agreement.
40 Brackets added.
41 Munich Security Conference 2019, Statement by Joseph R. Biden, 16 February.
42 The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014 during President Obama Administration, was 
designed to fund an increased American presence in Europe, to support exercises and training, to enhance 
the prepositioning of  forces, to improve infrastructure and to develop capacity building of  partners. The 
EDI amounted in 2018 a total of  4,777.3 million dollars and in 2020 an estimated amount of  5,910.6 
million dollars was made available, see European Deterrence Initiative (2019, p. 1). 
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Hungary and the announced withdrawal of  the United Kingdom from the EU, that a 
second attempt43 to formally enhance EU-NATO cooperation took place.
Despite the instability felt in Europe’s neighbourhood and the destabilizing effects 
caused by the consecutive interventions in Middle East, by the regime change in Libya 
and by the course of  American and Russian foreign policy, the European and euro-
atlantic institutions proved resilient44 to contingencies sourced in the personality of  
national decision-makers and on the hindrances of  party politics.
 A realization that the EU-NATO cooperation was an imperative followed two 
major challenges to transatlantic unity. On the one hand, the coalition force that inter-
vene in Kosovo (North Atlantic Council 1999a and 1999b) with NATO, despite the 
absence of  a United Nations mandate. On the other, the American intervention in 
Afghanistan, at a time when the United States declined to accept the possibility to invoke 
Article 5, in reaction to the terrorist attacks of  11 September 200145. 
The 2003 EU-NATO Declaration46 paved the way to the so-called development of  
a “strategic partnership” (Renard 2016b) between the EU and NATO. This led to the 
Berlin Plus agreement, opening the opportunity to the European Union to use NATO’s 
command and control collective structure and to institutionalise forms of  cooperation 
and political consultation between the two organizations in the field of  crisis manage-
ment and capability development on fight against terrorism, organized crime and cyber-
security.
In 2016, the need to foster better EU and NATO cooperation was in part a reaction 
to two exogenous events. On the one hand, the potential wearing down of  transatlantic 
relations in the face of  growing defence spending, following the unilateral involvement 
of  some allied countries in the Syrian conflict and in military operations in the context of  
fight against ISIS. On the other, due to a continuous ambivalence in relations between the 
United States, the EU and NATO sourced in the political and strategic narrative of  
American administrations against the development of  European defence integration. 
The notion of  European Security and Defence Identity or that of  a NATO’s European 
pillar47 prevailed over a more autonomous European defence, while the very same 
administrations pressed for a more independent operational output of  European allies, 
higher defence spending and stronger commitment of  Europeans to NATO’s military 
operations. 
Despite the potential for disagreement between the two organizations, contextual 
events did prove their adaptability to the changing strategic environment. NATO evolved 
from out-of-area to a new military stance with the return to European and transatlantic 
core defence functions, after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EU/CSDP, 
43 Being the previous the signature of  the Berlin Plus Agreement in the follow up of  the Kosovo crisis and 
the first interventions out of  area following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
44 See Kupchan (2019) and Zandee (2018).
45 NATO Press Release (2001-124) and NATO Secretary General (2001). See also Shea (2004).
46 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (2002).
47 A designation which lasted almost until 2003, see also North Atlantic Council (1990, § 4).
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although without abandoning its security interests towards the near neighbourhood, 
turned its security focus to the protection of  its citizens, to a more efficient response to 
external crises and called for better commitment towards regional security and capacity 
building of  partners, leading to stronger resilience and committed ownership.48 These 
almost simultaneous processes of  adaptation were accompanied by a closer relation 
among allies, centred on the principle of  “effective multilateralism” and strategic comple-
mentarity, contradicting the idea of  competition and duplication between the two 
organizations. This is a reserve frequently expressed among policy makers and analysts, 
although it has been formally addressed and solved within both organizations. 
From an early stage, EU actors have denied the idea of  competing or duplicating 
security and defence projects by stating that CSDP will act “where NATO as a whole is 
not or does not wish to get involved”, a concern repeatedly underlined since the 2001 
Laeken EU Council and reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty of  Lisbon 2007). More 
recently a statement adopted by the European Defence Agency assured that “no capacity 
duplication with other institutions such as NATO” would happen, stressing that PESCO 
would develop as a “coherent full spectrum force package” (EDA 2018, p. 4) in comple-
mentarity with NATO. This intention was also reiterated by the “Implementation Plan 
for Security and Defence”, by the “European Defence Action Plan” and by the “Notifi-
cation letter on PESCO to the Council and High Representative”. This concern with 
avoiding the idea of  duplication is also mirrored at the bilateral level among those 
which are strategically more capable. Recent agreements between actors such as France 
and Germany, as in the case of  the Achen Treaty in its Article 4, emphasises that the 
bilateral commitment to reinforce cooperation between France and Germany, regarding 
European security and defence is taken “In light of  their obligations under Article 5 
of  the North Atlantic Treaty of  4 April 1949 and of  Article 42 (7) of  the Treaty on 
European Union of  7 February 1992, as amended by the Treaty of  Lisbon of  13 Decem-
ber 2007 amending the Treaty on European Union” (Achen Treaty, 2019, Article 4 (1)) 
formally refuting any interpretations on duplication.
In July 2016, in Warsaw, the President of  the European Council, the President of  
the European Commission and NATO’s Secretary General signed an EU-NATO Joint 
Declaration on how to further cooperation between the two organizations. This initiative 
was followed in December, of  the same year, by an agreement on a common set of  pro-
posals to implement “EU-NATO Joint Declaration” (2016) by endorsing 42 proposals in 
the 7 areas agreed: defence capabilities; capacity building; industry and research; cyber 
security; hybrid threats, operational cooperation and exercises. NATO Secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg called the 2016 agreement “a milestone in our relations,” recognising 
that “neither organisation has the full range of  tools” to address new security and defence 
challenges unilaterally (NATO Meeting Ministers of  Foreign Affairs 2016).
48 See European Union Global Strategy (2016) and NATO Meeting Ministers of  Foreign Affairs (2016). For 
further reading see Howorth (2016).
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In December 2017 the Council of  the European Union49 would underline the neces-
sity to implement the Joint Declaration reinforcing cooperation at the strategic and 
operational levels between the EU and NATO. A particular interest was placed on the 
collaboration between the European Centre of  Excellence for Countering Hybrid 
Threats¸ staff  level cooperation on threat assessment regarding terrorism and on how to 
counter terrorist threats. The identification of  gender indicators and assessments on how 
they could improve situational awareness, in support of  the UNSCR 1325 agreed in 2000, 
were also addressed. It was agreed to promote EU and NATO staff  presence in advisory 
and preparedness bodies for missions of  the respective organizations and better coordi-
nation of  EU-NATO exercises.
In 2018 a EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed reiterating the interest and noting 
the progress achieved on what regards military mobility, counter-terrorism, cyber secu-
rity, hybrid threats, resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related 
risks and promoting the women, peace and security agenda. This was followed by the 
attendance of  the new High Representative Josep Borrell to NATO Defence Ministerial 
meeting. At the operational level there is a continuous cooperative effort in the Aegean 
Sea, where NATO has six ships helping to implement the agreement between the 
EU and Turkey on the refugee crisis, as well as support to Operation Sophia in the 
Mediterranean.50 This measures and actions reflect the particular security and defence 
concerns of  both organizations and how NATO and the EU may contribute to mitigate 
them. Coherence, complementarity and interoperability remain the three main drivers for 
EU-NATO cooperation and the only acceptable and feasible in times of  limited budgets 
and increasing new challenges to security and defence.
However, the cumulative nature of  the process of  cooperation that result from the 
EU-NATO Joint Declarations cooperation, rather than phased and incremental, may 
be counterproductive for three reasons. First, for reasons of  capacity availability and 
funding. Second due to the length of  national legislative cycles, which may limit the 
political willingness of  Member States to pursue, in a sustainable manner, new coopera-
tive engagements once the political cycle has changed. Third, and as Verbeke notes (2017, 
p. 5), structural projects such as those related with states “Long term strategic interests 
or investments (such as energy infrastructure or major defence platforms) are neglected 
in favour of  short-term tactical advantages or pet projects”. This trend may compromise 
the binding effect of  more structural commitments, agreed within multilateral arrange-
ments, such as NATO and the EU. 
Each Member State encloses very specific political, strategic, diplomatic and security 
cultures, distinct historical legacies and operational output. This may be determinant 
on how security and defence cooperation moves forward and how Member States and 
participant states accommodate alternative frameworks in multilateral, minilateral and 
49 Council of  the European Union (2017/14802).
50 This last initiative will be replaced in 2020 by a new CSDP operation, Operation IRINI with the objective 
to help implementing the arms embargo to Libya.
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bilateral settings, adjusting to new processes of  security governance. Connected socie- 
ties are as prone to accountability as they are to the immediacy of  results, a demand that 
fits poorly to the required long-term test to which regional and international cooperation 
is exposed to, in order to prove resilience to external challenges and efficient output in 
the face of  change.
5. Advantages of  EU-NATO Cooperation
Despite considerable improvements leading to better institutionalization of  coope- 
ration, between the EU and NATO, academic and policy debates are still focused on 
traditional divides, which can be systematized in two approaches: on how to address and 
manage security problems. Those that, in the words of  Glenn Snyder (1984:489), postu-
late the effectiveness of  “toughness and confrontation” and those who value a “strategy 
of  conciliation”. This divide has been characterising the cooperative stance between 
the two organizations for decades and those of  Member States foreign relations. To a 
certain extent, this dichotomy affects both the analytical and strategic approach, when 
addressing Euro-Atlantic security and defence relations. This varies from a persistent 
concern with the division of  strategic work among European and non-European allies 
(Yost, 2000 and 2007); to the problem of  strategic and financial burden sharing (Kivimäki 
2019; Jakobsen 2018; National Defence Strategy 2018) and to the conditionality that 
results in the fact European defence will only be welcomed by the United States and by 
the more Atlanticist allies, if  and when it strengthens NATO (Brattberg 2018; Billon-
Galland and Thomson 2018; Leonard and Shapiro 2019). The specific concern with 
division of  strategic work in a NATO context and the reluctance of  some Member States 
to embrace role specialisation of  certain security and defence tasks at the European level, 
has evolved into a new perception on the disagreements registered among allies on the 
Alliance collective share of  risks and defence expenses versus selective common invest-
ments in European security and defence, through Permanent Structured Cooperation. 
The two moments of  strategic strain in 2003 and 2016, did not impair Euro-Atlantic 
cooperation and despite concerns with duplication and competition, developments have 
shown that complementarity between the two organizations is valued the most.51
Several circumstances have been enabling better opportunities for cooperation 
between the EU and NATO. First, contextual related reasons such as the emergence 
of  hybrid threats in the Eastern Europe, the threat of  potential and actual external 
interferences on allied countries internal affairs, the consequences of  the refugee crisis 
over European unity and the uncertainties caused by the British referendum.52 To this 
already long list, one must add the internal and regional consequences of  the conflict in 
Syria, the position of  President Donald Trump regarding NATO and the EU creating a 
perception of  existential threat the long and well succeed transatlantic alliance. On the 
51 On the 21 January 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in an address to the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Sub-Committee on Security and Defence welcomed closer 
NATO-EU relations and recognised its unprecedented level of  cooperation.
52 See Baciu (2019).
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one hand, it led to the claim that Europe should aim at a stronger role in the security 
and defence of  Europe. On the other, that that strengthened position would only be 
supported if  and when it reinforced NATO. In the face of  current security challenges, 
unforeseeable outcomes of  insecurity, limited resources and greater interdependency 
related with the consequences of  uncertainty, the development of  cooperation, rather 
than competition, is an expected outcome for relations among states and within interna-
tional organizations. The deterioration of  insecurity in North Africa, following the 
collapse of  Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, the downfall of  the so called Islamic 
state in the Middle East, the consequences of  revisionist foreign policies and the spread 
of  terrorist acts in Europe point to the diversity of  sources of  insecurity and to the 
necessity for a more efficient and distinct form of  security and defence cooperation53, of  
which military cooperation is just a part. Closer functional cooperation between the EU 
and NATO may help to better deal with the uncertainties of  systemic insecurity in 
Eastern Europe and on the South and South-eastern rim of  the Mediterranean, offering 
the opportunity to safeguard distinct national and international security interests. 
Decision makers and international bureaucracies should endorse what Member States do 
better, whether that is crisis response or conflict management, fight against terrorism, 
maritime security and mitigation of  cyber and hybrid threats, according to different stra-
tegic cultures and interests, while fostering ownership and cooperation in response to 
security challenges.
Second, collaborative practice strives better in institutional environments where 
international socialization among security and defence actors is high. In strongly con-
nected structures political, public scrutiny may turn collaborative practice into an instru-
ment that adds legitimacy, better mobilizes public and political will and creates more 
favourable conditions to resource security and defence agencies, such as NATO and the 
EU-CSDP. NATO and the EU gather relevant strategic players, share a high degree 
of  membership overlap and their international security mandates have a specific focus 
on European security and defence interests. This brings into Euro-Atlantic collabo- 
rative practice both an element of  representativeness of  interests and a dimension of  
legitimacy. 
Third, power shifts in the international system may lead to changes in the nature of  
security, opening up a new range of  tasks for international organizations beyond their 
original mandate, from military missions to operations-other-than-war, to humanitarian 
relief, organized crime eradication and disaster relief. This is reflected in new security 
tasks, but also in new mobilizing arguments in the way security roles are performed, such 
as preventive security, pre-emptive military action, mitigation of  hybrid threats and crisis 
response, rather than classical military offensive, an option that governments and public 
opinions appear to be less inclined to support. New role prescriptions not only demand 
new military and non-military responses, but also a security discourse that appeals to 
cooperative action, combining international law, centred on value-based principles and 
53 Cf. Leonard and Shapiro (2019).
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arguments that serve national interests, while suggesting further functional integration 
on security and defence. Role specialisation may be an “asset” on demand given that not 
all armed and security forces can afford to have the full spectrum of  capabilities required 
to mitigate current challenges and threats.
The institutionalisation of  new forms of  cooperative security, as established between 
the EU-NATO, by the corresponding declarations on cooperation of  2003, 2016 and 
2018, underline the need to share risks and responsibilities in specific security levels, 
notably in the context of  hybrid threats, maritime security to mitigate illegal trafficking 
of  human beings and search and rescue of  irregular migrants at sea. A good example 
of  EU-NATO cooperation at the operational level was developed in the Horn of  Africa 
to counter maritime piracy54, together with missions in land with the aim to develop 
capacity building on maritime security, in coastal areas in the region. Other cooperative 
efforts were developed in 2016, through Operation Sophia, with the aim to lessen 
the challenges posed by the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea, in combination with the 
support given to the Turkish and Greek authorities and the support made available by 
EU FRONTEX. In each of  these missions and operations, both NATO and the EU 
moved from traditional security and defence in the far border, to counter-piracy and 
irregular migration in the near border. 
The fourth advantage of  enhancing security and defence cooperation between the 
EU and NATO results from the fact that, organizations and the states that incorporate 
them commit to cooperative frameworks for reasons of  easier access to specialized 
knowledge, information and resources. Currently, the EU as already access to command 
and planning structures of  NATO, under the Berlin Plus agreement and in the future 
it can be envisaged an eventual access of  NATO to the EU-CSDP specific civilian 
proficiencies of  the European crisis response toolkit. The development of  both the 
EU CSDP Civilian Compact (Council of  the European Union 2018) and the projects 
developed under Permanent Structured Cooperation (Council Decision 2017) may 
contribute to develop European actors roles, knowledge and experience on civilian crisis 
management, while supplementing the amount of  resources needed among participant 
states in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and in post-conflict situations.
For cooperation to happen political will and trust must be present. These conditions 
are not mere technical arrangements, sometimes not even financial ones, they are a choice 
that shapes the opportunity to engage collective. The participation in new cooperative 
security frameworks in “conditions of  confidence building, transparency, information 
availability and knowledge” (Nunes 2006, p. 89), enable institutional mimetism to strive 
among organizations, thus facilitating cooperation or conversely creating a situation of  
perceived competition for mandates and resources. In the case of  NATO, there is a 
growing appeal among allies for it to perform civilian security tasks for which the 
Alliance was not originally created, as a political and military organization. In the case 
of  EU-CSDP, one observes an increasing institutionalization of  conditions aiming at a 
54 Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta (since 2008) and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016).
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better operational deliver, following the approval of  a Security and Defence Action Plan 
(European Council 2016) and the agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation.55 
Lastly, the fact both NATO and the EU are politically integrated and highly 
socialised organizations, bound by similar norms and interests, makes political coope- 
ration an opportunity and the prospect of  more efficient operational collective engage-
ment more likely. Cooperation is expected to work better in an interdependent security 
environment, where multiple memberships to organizations are present and where 
resources scarcity or uneven distribution of  resources occurs turning cooperation into a 
more advantageous and less costly alternative.
6. Developing Euro Atlantic Cooperation
The EU and NATO not only share twenty-two member states, they also congregate 
actors who are more able and capable of  meeting current military and non-military 
challenges and threats. Regardless their common and collective military power and non-
military resources, NATO or the EU do not have the monopoly of  international respon-
sibility to address and to solve systemic security challenges. Terms such as “ownership”, 
“resilience”56, “capacity building” and “non-executive missions” are now recurrent in 
policy guidelines appearing to reflect that understanding, for reasons of  interest or 
constraint. For reasons of  interest, because collective security systems are not only pow-
ered by common values and principles but also, and perhaps mainly, by the national 
interests of  participant states. Logics of  influence and visibility bind national administra-
tions involved in crisis management and shape the expectations of  return of  investment 
on cooperative security, according to specific geographies and policy domains of  interest. 
For reasons of  constraint, because on matters of  international security, Heads of  State 
and Government of  Member States respond primarily to national electorates and in a 
lesser degree to European or transatlantic institutions. These two constraints sometimes 
justify some disinvestment from roles and tasks at the upper end of  the hard security and 
defence spectrum and a greater reliance on policies, instruments and processes leading to 
capacity building in security or defence.
The development of  a culture of  commitment among member states is also a 
powerful driving force for cooperation to happen and its importance is three-fold. First, 
to identify areas of  cooperative security where organizations benefit from comparative 
advantages of  one as compared to the other, placing them at the service of  cooperative 
security endeavours, whether that is crisis prevention and response, conflict manage-
ment, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Second, to meet pledges with means, mitigating 
what Sven Biscop called a “culture of  zero compliance” (Biscop 2019), which unbalan- 
ces the collective efforts of  joint action and the effectiveness of  common cooperative 
55 In 2018, in the context of  NATO and the EU cooperation on good governance, in defence and security 
sector reform of  partner countries, the European Commission agreed to contribute 2 million EUR to the 
NATO Building Integrity Trust Fund for 2019-2022. 
56 For further reading see Tocci (2020) and Juncos (2017).
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security on the ground. Third, to avoid “gatekeeper”57 behaviour which hampers effec-
tive multilateral cooperation in theatre by furthering competition for mandates, resources 
and regional and international visibility.
The fragmentation of  challenges and threats, changes in the nature of  security and 
the prevalence of  national interest among international players also determine alternative 
types of  cooperative configurations, which compete and sometimes replace international 
and regional security organizations. In the post-Cold War a myriad of  smaller configu- 
rations, as addressed in section 3, such as minilateral formations of  interested players 
composed of  some, not all, but well capacitated groups of  countries, configurate what 
Moret in another context calls “functional multilateralism” (2016, p. 2). This may indicate 
that circumstances of  limited available resources and fragmented threats and challenges, 
affect member states differently. This is likely to lead them to integrate smaller and 
more flexible power configurations, for instance for power projection and force display 
to re-establish security outside the formality and lengthy decision making processes of  
policies like CSDP or a formal defence organization, such as NATO.
Another trend that may inform future euro-atlantic cooperation takes the form of  
clusterization of  security interests and resources within wider regional frameworks58 
expressed in a multi-clustered setting “with different clusters of  relevant players shaping 
different areas” (Missiroli 2015, p. 2). The EU Global Strategy itself  called for the 
development of  “cooperative regional orders” as “providers of  global governance” (EU 
Global Strategy 2016) and multipliers of  international norms and institutions. This 
reflects three things. First, it indicates an attempt to return regional security responsibili-
ties to local actors or to those that, not being part of  that specific geography, have 
national interests to safeguard in the region. Second, it stresses the presence of  more 
security actors in the system and notes shifts in the recognition of  who matters in the 
power system: loosen cooperative configurations versus formal institutions. Third, it 
translates the tensions between the changes in the nature of  security, transformed into 
something more than military threats and the necessity of  means to meet them other 
than “threatening and using of  force” (Gray 2019, p. 5). 
Changes in the power system result in adaptations in the concept of  sovereignty 
and sovereign obligations. As Richard N. Haass acknowledges, a system “built around 
the protection and prerogatives of  states it is increasingly inadequate in today’s glo- 
balized world” (2017, p. 1) and international order must reflect the level of  security 
57 Debuysere and Blockmans (2019, p. 256) drawing on the results of  the empirical study, conducted earlier 
in the framework of  a wider research project EUNPACK (2016), note that states that play the gatekeeper 
in a particular crisis situation constraint the impact of  other actors in the field. The authors use the exam-
ple of  the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq and the role of  France in Mali with Operation Serval. See 
also EUNPACK – A conflict sensitive unpacking of  the EU Comprehensive Approach to Conflict and 
Crises Mechanisms (2016) a project developed to assess whether the EU external crisis response is aware 
of  the political and social context on the ground, covering the complete crisis cycle, EU crisis management 
toolbox and the EU response in distinct regional contexts. The results of  the project were presented at a 
conference held by CEPS in 18-19 March 2019.
58 For complementary reading on theories of  regional cooperation see Börzel (2016).
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interdependence and interconnectedness one lives in. The complexity and diversity 
of  security problems changed the nature of  security, currently located beyond the sole 
interests of  states and the role of  the armed forces. It also opened opportunities for 
greater regionalization of  security configurations and for the growing participation of  
new security actors, such as justice and home affairs actors, asserting Missiroli obser- 
vation on the presence of  “relevant players shaping different areas” (Idem, ibidem). 
Security interdependence and interconnectedness share a twofold relation. Greater inter-
dependence calls for better interconnectedness and vice-versa, whether at the politi- 
cal-strategic or operational level. The EU-NATO Joint Declarations implicitly recognised 
this condition of  interdependence and the requirement for interconnectedness in order 
to enhance strategic and operational stance.
The cooperative modes of  regionalisation and clusterization, rather than hampering 
cooperation between NATO and the EU may improve it in various ways. First, by being 
closer to the sources of  instability, regional configurations can hold better legitimacy and 
ownership of  the security tasks ahead, engaging and committing local actors. Second, by 
engaging “shaping powers” (Hellmann 2016, p. 11) regional cooperative configurations 
such as the G20, regional organizations and local actors such as the African Union, the 
Arab League and the G5 Sahel may help easing the efforts invested by the EU and 
NATO in external crisis. Third, it may help balancing the American retrieve of  interna-
tional multilateralism, the semantic hinderances of  President Trump towards global 
(United Nations) and transatlantic (NATO) cooperative security and the turn of  its 
foreign policy away from international regimes. Fourth, it may contribute to balance the 
decrease or actual lack of  compromise of  some EU Member States towards civilian 
missions, which have suffered a total staff  size reduction by three times since 2010 (Pietz 
and Vorrath 2018). Fifth, it may press Europe to develop some degree of  strategic auton-
omy59 from the US and NATO, due to its greater experience in the civilian dimensions of  
crisis management 60 and its focus on the root causes of  crisis and conflicts. Sixth, 
regional configurations could turn cooperation into a more inclusive endeavour, congre-
gating different actors and modes of  governance, able to reflect the socio, cultural and 
political idiosyncrasies of  local realities, often foreign to the EU-NATO families, but 
determinant to how each organization is perceived by third countries. Last, clusterization 
of  capacities and resources saves investments, although it increases interdependence, 
helps synchronize security and defence planning, improves interconnectedness and is 
likely to enhance readiness to intervene in crisis response.
On the past twenty years, security interdependence is greater, power distributions are 
less polarised and security risks more diffuse. Grevi (2009, p. 24) notes that “to shape 
59 Strategic autonomy does not comprehend solely better European military capabilities, but also civilian 
proficiencies that may allow the EU to act whenever others are unwilling or unable to act holding wider 
responsibilities in the field of  international and regional security and defence.
60 Leonard and Shapiro (2019, p.12) in this context claim that the “EU and its member states should create 
either a mindset or a policy mechanism devoted to protecting their overall ability to act independently of  
other great powers”.
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multilateral cooperation or lead collective action in addressing international challenges 
becomes a central feature of  power”, so will benchmarking it. Benchmarking multilateral 
cooperation between EU and NATO could be an indicator of  political resolute and 
effective capability to set a transformative security agenda driven by specific security and 
defence targets, according to the profile of  challenge or threat. This implies more than 
shared security goals, as expressed in Joint EU-NATO Declarations of  2016 and 2018, it 
may demand for political, strategic and operational choices for the fittest organization to 
lead or to complement, whenever needed or wanted. 
This assessment calls for a better analysis of  who does what in security and defence 
(Nunes 2015 and 2019). Which organization offers the best resources in security problem 
addressing and problem-solving, which may lead to consider a review of  how strategic 
work could be better shared? At what level are synergies more likely to complement 
each other? How committed are states of  both the EU and NATO to share information, 
intelligence and capabilities to counter hybrid threats, assure cyber security and cyber 
defence or improve maritime security cooperation? How willing are European and 
transatlantic allies to cooperate in a customized manner according to location, level and 
nature of  the security challenges and threats ahead? 
Answering to these questions would include to consider the interests of  major 
strategic players, the possession of  strategic assets nationally or collectively owned and 
evaluate the adequacy of  existent models of  decision-making by consensus and unanim-
ity. This could set collective decisions free from circumstantial political pressure by mem-
ber states to push forward matters of  national interests or to instigate regional rivalry. 
7. CSDP and NATO – The Way Forward
Better cooperation between the EU and NATO is likely to call for institutional 
adaptation of  its structures and capabilities to the changing nature of  threats. Current 
challenges are often different from conventional warfare among equals, for which tradi-
tional alliances like NATO were created or whenever they pose a test, which was not 
present at the founding moment of  an organization like the EU, such as the migrant 
crisis or cyber warfare.
Effective cooperation between NATO and the EU also depends on collective 
perceptions and understandings on NATO and CSDP distinct security identities and 
purposes, compelling to reassess perceptions of  organizational efficiency of  security 
organizations.
CSDP appears better equipped to make use of  preventive action through thematic 
and geographical strategies, being able to connect various policy levels from security to 
development and humanitarian relief, making it particularly suitable to deal with complex 
non-military emergencies. On the other hand, NATO as a defence organization, draws 
its influence from a condition of  strategic dependence among allies, centred on the stra-
tegic supremacy of  a superpower and that of  strategically more capable allies. It benefits 
from higher strategic and operational leverage due to an agreed strategic concept, 
common doctrine, a single decision-making under the North Atlantic Council and a well 
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powered military structure. It is perceived as more efficient due to its operational output, 
impact of  its military capabilities and underlining principle of  reciprocity under Article 5, 
with a tacit guarantee of  collective defence. NATO can perform better in situations of  
conflict management and stabilization, but falls short of  experience and capabilities on 
other than war situations, in the civilian dimension of  crisis management, reconstruction, 
development aid and humanitarian assistance.
The present differences in organizational design, decision making structure, voting 
methods, purpose and strategic outreach and output generate different levels of  political 
and operational trust. Parallel to this institutional distinction, one observes different 
degrees of  interdependence and functional dependency among allies regarding doctrinal 
and interoperability standards, training, modernisation of  the armed forces and procure-
ment. 
These differences affect the comprehensiveness of  security agendas of  both organi-
zations and those of  the member states within them. It shapes – how broad these secu-
rity agendas are –, thus influencing the constitution of  different perceptions of  threat, 
risk and use of  force, helping to identify which security referents matter. It also informs 
the very concept of  strategic partnership (with whom to cooperate), determines how 
participants are more or less willing to cooperate and influences national administrations’ 
assessments of  preferred strategic partners.
These layers of  differentiation within NATO and the EU reflect member states own 
security identity and their distinct security and defence focuses. Those who form the 
euro-atlantic defence stronghold like the US, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Turkey and 
Poland and occupy the upper end of  the security and defence spectrum are willing to 
project EU-NATO strategic cooperation at a global scale, while meeting their own 
national interests. The swing member states or allies, like eastern European countries, will 
only commit to CSDP, if  it does not harm traditional relations with US and NATO. 
Those like the Netherlands and Denmark use EU-NATO cooperative security to advance 
their foreign, security and defence policies, strengthening their already internationally 
active stand. Germany the “shaping power”, acquired in the new environment of  insta-
bility a renewed strategic centrality with the deterioration of  security in NATO’s eastern 
border. Finally, the Nordic countries like Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and also 
Austria, perceive EU-NATO cooperation as an opportunity to take part in regional crisis 
management, while acknowledging security instruments as part of  a broader set consti-
tuted by diplomacy, sustainable development and humanitarian aid.
Several aspects of  European and Atlantic security and defence cooperation need 
careful consideration. First to assess how to improve planning and command options and 
capabilities for CSDP missions and operations, especially among those who are strategi-
cally able and capable. 
Second to improve the possibilities of  access to capabilities of  command, control 
and assistance in operational planning, in the Berlin Plus framework, for EU led opera-
tions in crisis management contexts, which may use NATO collective assets and capa-
bilities. A desirable turn could reflect an adaptation of  the Berlin Plus mechanism into a 
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more flexible arrangement regarding which Turkey, Greece or France could disagree, 
without blocking access to NATO’s command, control and planning capabilities. A simi-
lar modality is foreseen in the Permanent Structured Cooperation Protocol for non-
participant Member States. This would allow allies to retain their political positions 
on the Turkey-Cyprus issue, Greece regarding Macedonia or even France on NATO’s 
access to civilian capabilities, without blocking effective and desirable cooperation of  the 
organization as a whole.
Third, to enhance European command options for CSDP operations. The existing 
planning cell for CDSP operations within SHAPE, in close collaboration with the 
EU Military staff, backed by sound cooperation between Military Planning Conduct 
Capability and Civilian Planning Conduct Capability in support of  CSDP missions and 
operations, under the oversight of  a joint authority, could improve cooperation. The 
institutional changes that occurred among the CSDP and crisis response system, since 
March 2019 (EEAS 2020), may contribute to overcome some of  the difficulties felt in the 
implementation of  integrated approach. These changes by concentrating authority and 
by “integrating, rather than coordinating, different levels of  the EU action” (Debuysere 
and Blockmans 2019, p. 247), bring closer the civilian and the military branch within 
EEAS, which may enhance cooperation at the multilateral level.
Fourth, to institutionalise forms of  civilian and military cooperation and the deve- 
lopment of  dual use capabilities, under the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of  2018, could 
be used to meet complex emergencies, for instance to help dealing with the consequences 
of  atypical climate events, that often require sudden emergency relief, in which air and 
naval means are crucial. This could be a useful and welcomed aspiration. 
Fifth, to improve capability development drawing on the incentives launched in 2017 
by Permanent Structured Cooperation under a new contractual approach to PESCO. 
This initiative gathers like-minded states, strategically capable and willing, without 
overstretching interested participant states, concerned with capabilities shortages and 
budgetary pressure to meet NATO’s 2%GDP target. Also in this context, the use of  wills 
and skills of  participant states to develop PESCO from prevention to stabilisation and 
emergency relief, covering the whole spectrum of  crisis response cycles.
Sixth, developments in the so called European Defence Technology Industrial Base 
will affect European defence markets requiring a good coordination between European 
representatives, institutions and industries. In 2018, the European Defence Agency 
assessed the persistence of  various capabilities gap in Europe, which a better EU-NATO 
cooperation could contribute to overcome especially strategic air lift, air refuelling, cyber-
defence, unmanned aerial vehicles, surveillance and reconnaissance, capabilities leading 
to suppression of  enemy air defences, satellite communications and treatment of  high 
resolution imagery.61
Seventh, consistent action by NATO and the EU could mutually reinforce common 
interests, for instance by combining the EU coercive diplomacy with the support of  EU 
61 See European Defence Agency (2018).
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sanctions and NATO’s military force and force display. This was already use with some 
degree of  success following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.
The nature and intractable character of  challenges and crises in Africa and Middle 
East, is currently aggravated by lower political solidarity within Europe, which culmi-
nated with the announcement of  the United Kingdom withdrawal from the European 
Union and the American ill judgment on an international values-based order. This makes 
mutualisation of  responsibility a valuable asset, perhaps more than a cumulative approach 
to cooperative processes, in the form of  74 EU-NATO cooperative measures or the 
three, soon to be four, waves of  PESCO projects. Collective defence and cooperative 
security, based on multilateralization of  interests and strategic benefits and obligations, 
need to include regional approaches to conflicts and crisis, allowing relevant local actors 
to take ownership of  processes and solutions, building a more structural foundation for 
resilience to strive. 
Proliferation of  cooperative arrangements at a time when international norms, 
multilateralism and global governance are at odds with semantic foul and unsubstantiated 
judgment, on the achievements of  international organizations and collective security 
demand to take the best from the existing agreements and platforms of  cooperation. 
This requires ability to be flexible in the use of  instruments of  power and influence in 
crisis and conflict, in a manner able to solve more than military problems. Organizations 
like the EU and NATO have the resources to contribute to deal with the structural 
political and societal problems left behind, after crises and conflicts have de-escalated. 
Flexibility, adaptability and joint action will determine which organizations have the 
best political and strategic stand to hold positive transformative impact in regional and 
international affairs.
Final Considerations
The changes that occurred at the international level, following the global fight on 
terrorism, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the significant changes in the 
foreign policies of  international powers, such as US and Russia, led to greater compe- 
tition among security actors. These events also pressed international organizations to 
adapt. NATO’s return to the foundational area of  application of  the Washington Treaty 
and the EU/CSDP institutional developments post 2016, suggest adaptability, but 
also necessity to preserve political relevance, strategic purpose and rank in internatio- 
nal security. There is a significant saturation of  the security ecosystem, where security 
organizations operate, with a significant overlap of  memberships, strategic ambitions, 
mandates, resources and capabilities. In international security relevance and purpose 
are intrinsically dependent of  strategic ambition, technological and operational output, 
conditioning the way crises and conflicts are successfully addressed and managed. 
Crisis response tasks gained a new focus calling for modernization of  defence 
administrations, systems and capabilities, but also claimed for better and more effective 
multilateral cooperation. Exogenous events sourced in the geopolitical fragmentation 
of  Eastern Europe, on the transnational impact of  terrorism and the consequences of  
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revisionist policies, challenged the international liberal order and created the opportu- 
nity for new agreements between the EU and NATO, which transcend their traditional 
political/civilian and military mandates. After 2016, both organizations evolved in the 
direction of  better collaborative crisis management from crisis response, to resilience, 
institution building and ownership in the near border. 
EU-NATO Joint Declarations have been forged in moments of  geopolitical and 
strategic tension among powers, when unilateralism and revisionism tested the persis-
tence and endurance of  both organizations. The 2016 and 2018 Joint Declarations sig-
nalled the capacity of  the EU and NATO to adapt and strive against exogenous and 
internal events that may have led to fragmentation. The end of  bipolarity launched 
NATO to out-of-area and stressed the EU/CSDP strong advocacy for multilateralism, 
international law and peaceful resolution of  crisis and conflicts. Later, external contin-
gencies and events in the far border of  security in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and in the 
European neighbourhood sent NATO back to its original area of  strategic responsibility, 
for reasons of  fatigue and collective strategic interest, strengthening its military presence 
in the eastern border. The EU pressed by challenges in the near neighbourhood, posed 
by regime changes and by the refugee crisis reviewed its position towards cooperation 
and crisis response, based on ownership, resilience and capacity building. A bold develop-
ment, in 2016, into the direction of  a defence policy in the making, transcended the 
declaratory tone of  previous attempts, supplementing policy declarations with capacities, 
funding and a renewed motive for cooperation with NATO. This approach brought new 
opportunities for mutualisation of  security and defence responses in the domains of  
counter maritime piracy, cyber and hybrid challenges and threats, energy security and 
maritime security in coastal and maritime areas.
New challenges and threats generated different security and defence settings within 
which interests and preferences can be hold and sustained in multilateral, minilateral and 
strategic partnership configurations. These result from a tension between the core of  
intergovernmental decision making in Brussels and national interests and preferences of  
states. However, the participation in these configurations does not necessarily mean 
that they replace formal security and defence organizations. It simply means they offer 
space for collective mobilisation, outside or with the cooperation of  the EU and NATO, 
whenever the response of  formal organizations, as a whole, is not possible for reasons 
of  self-restrain, lack of  consensus, representativeness and resources availability. Often 
these simplified configurations are able to obtain convergence of  security interests 
outside the formalities and complex decision-making procedures of  organizations, like 
the EU/CSDP and NATO, improving significantly the processes of  immediate force 
generation and force projection in rapid response to crisis.
In the context of  EU-NATO cooperation, crisis response gained a new emphasis 
calling for better cooperation, but the debate on capability gap, competition and dupli- 
cation still shadows the effectiveness of  this endeavour, added by new disputes between 
NATO’s strategic responsibility and Europe’s ambition for strategic autonomy. This is a 
perilous and useless debate, but with potential to affect the purpose and impact of  EU/
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CSDP and NATO in guaranteeing international security. Coherence, complementarity 
and interoperability remain the three main drivers for EU-NATO cooperation and the 
only ones justifiable in a context of  new challenges to security and defence and limited 
budgets. However, the cumulative nature of  the process of  cooperation that result from 
the EU-NATO Joint Declarations, rather than phased and incremental may run into its 
own limits. These regard reasons of  political support of  Members States, continuous 
funding and availability of  resources required by formal organizations, unlike ad hoc 
security and defence configurations or particular unilateral actions reliant on immediate 
political gain, in detriment of  more structural and effective transformative output.
Consensus around EU-NATO cooperation will always be limited by distinct histo- 
rical, security and strategic legacies, industrial and technological interests and operational 
performance. The current need for immediacy of  results, fits poorly with the required 
long-term test to which regional and international cooperation are subjected to, in order 
to prove effective towards external challenges. The Alliance need for a sustainable 
collective share of  expenses, risks and benefits, cohabits now with selective common 
investments in European security and defence, notably through Permanent Structured 
Cooperation.
Terms like ownership, resilience, capacity building fill policy documents expressing 
reasons of  interest and reasons of  constraint. Reasons of  interest, because collective 
security systems are not only driven by commonality of  norms and principles, but also by 
influence, visibility and expectation of  return of  investment. For reasons of  constraint, 
because in democratic systems governments are answerable to national electorates which, 
in the end of  day, will determine their political fate. This leads to some opposition 
between loosen cooperative configurations versus the formal political, human and mate-
rial cost of  the efforts invested by the EU and NATO in external crisis. Additionally, 
differences in the comprehensiveness of  the respective security agendas influence 
perceptions of  threat, risk and use of  force and ultimately outline the choice of  preferred 
partner strategic. 
An excessive focus on matters of  competition, duplication and capabilities gap, 
between the EU and NATO, is a domain of  analytical solace for both analysts and 
practioners, leaving open an interesting field of  research on cooperation at multiple 
levels. It is beyond the scope of  this working paper an in-depth analysis on the security 
impact of  coexistent configurations such as multilateralism, minilateralism, strategic 
partnership with formal organizations. This three-layered system offers analytical space 
to empirical research regarding in which conditions and how this coexistence strengthens 
or conversely weakens cooperative security. It also enables to examine the current diffi-
culties of  regional organizations to deal with security challenges or on the contrary, it may 
offer evidence of  ability of  the EU and NATO and their individual Member States to 
adapt, by sometimes incorporating, others by cooperating with these alternative coopera-
tive configurations, in the field of  security.
EU and NATO cooperation may also offer a rich field of  research in terms 
of  benchmarking, as an indicator of  political resolute and effective capability to set a 
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transformative security agenda, driven by specific security and defence targets, according 
to the dimension of  the challenge or threat. Current research and practice require a more 
comprehensive outlook of  who does what in security and defence. Which organization 
offers the best resources in security problem addressing and problem-solving. This may 
generate useful empirical considerations on how strategic reviews should be undertaken 
and cooperation improved. At what level are synergies more likely to complement each 
other? How willing are European and transatlantic allies to cooperate in a customized 
manner according to location, level and nature of  security challenges and threats? Lastly, 
answering these questions would imply to consider the adequacy of  existent models of  
organization, decision-making and capabilities development, in meeting on the immedi-
ate needs in response to complex crisis.
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ProsPects For euro-atlaNtIc cooPeratIoN
at a time when political will coincides with strategic necessity for better security and defense 
cooperation, between the eu and Nato, this working paper examines how academic and policy-
-oriented work address eu-Nato cooperative relations and how they inform perceptions about the 
two organizations. It debates how contextual challenges affect the euro-atlantic region and create 
opportunities for better euro-atlantic cooperation, in the context of diverse security and defence 
configurations or within the formal settings of the two organizations. It argues that a saturation of 
the security and defence environment, through the proliferation of multilateral, minilateral and 
strategic approaches does not hinder euro-atlantic cooperation. It highlights contexts of opportu-
nity and advantages of enhanced cooperation between eu/csDP and Nato. Finally, it envisages 
the development of current and expected venues for euro-atlantic mutual cooperative support.
